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I. INTRODUCTION 
There is much debate, and has been for some time, over 
whether we have a “living” Constitution, one that adapts to changing 
circumstances and evolves over time. The metaphor arose and gained 
initial force during the Progressive Era and has been at the forefront 
of the debate on constitutional interpretation ever since. 
There is a more recent division, most prominently marked by 
Professor Owen Jones and Professors Brian Leiter and Michael 
Weisberg, over whether biology has a meaningful role to play in legal 
developments. Professor Jones has written many articles promoting 
the potential utility of behavioral and evolutionary science to law.1 By 
contrast, Professors Leiter and Weisberg emphatically proclaim that 
“evolutionary biology offers nothing to law.”2 
Despite the ongoing debate over “living” constitutionalism and 
the fervor of the new debate over the role of biology, no one has tried 
to connect the two. One might assume that the lack of attention is due 
to the metaphorical nature of the “living” Constitution. But scholars 
have studied evolutionary metaphors in other legal areas, such as 
common law and statutory law,3 though most such studies are 
 
 1. See, e.g., Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law: An Introduction and 
Application to Child Abuse, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1117 (1997); Owen D. Jones, Sex, Culture, and the 
Biology of Rape: Toward Explanation and Prevention, 87 CAL. L. REV. 827 (1999); Owen D. Jones 
& Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 405 (2005). His most 
recent work is on the endowment effect and its potential impact on the law. See, e.g., Owen D. 
Jones & Sarah F. Brosnan, Law, Biology, and Property: A New Theory of the Endowment Effect, 
49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1935 (2008). As recent critics have noted, Professor Jones is not alone; 
several others have explored behavioral biology’s implications for law. See Brian Leiter & 
Michael Weisberg, Why Evolutionary Biology is (So Far) Irrelevant to the Law, at 3 n.3 (U. of 
Texas Law Sch. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 89, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=892881 (citing others). 
 2. Leiter & Weisberg, supra note 1, at 5. 
 3. See, e.g., PETER STEIN, LEGAL EVOLUTION: THE STORY OF AN IDEA (1980); E. Donald 
Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 38, 38 (1985) (providing 
a descriptive account of “how the most influential idea of the last century, Charles Darwin’s 
theory of biological evolution, has affected the way lawyers think about the law”); William 
Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 
(1991); William H. Rodgers, Jr., Where Environmental Law and Biology Meet: Of Pandas’ 
Thumbs, Statutory Sleepers, and Effective Law, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 25 (1993); J.B. Ruhl, The 
Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and its 
Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407 (1996); M.B.W. Sinclair, The Use of 
Evolution Theory in Law, 64 U. DET. L. REV. 451 (1987); Jeffrey Evans Stake, Evolution of Rules 
in a Common Law System: Differential Litigation of the Fee Tail and Other Perpetuities, 32 FLA. 
DODSON_PAGE 10/28/2008 12:33:49 AM 
2008] A DARWINIST VIEW 1321 
descriptive—even “taxonomist”—rather than evaluative.4 To my 
knowledge, a biological evaluation of the metaphor of a “living” 
Constitution—a deep exploration of whether biology can tell us 
something about our conceptualization of constitutional change—has 
never been done. 
That is unfortunate. The metaphor “living” Constitution 
appears regularly in important legal debates. It imports concepts from 
biology and, in the process, allows those biological concepts to shape 
the use and meaning of the metaphor in legal debate. Use of the 
metaphor implies that the Constitution has some of the traits of a 
living organism, in particular, that it grows and evolves. The 
metaphor is used intentionally to evoke biological truths as a way of 
informing legal understanding. It presents a normative vision of the 
Constitution that informs how it should be understood, interpreted, 
and applied.5 
We ought to look critically at this metaphor and the vision it 
entails. If the metaphor is inaccurate, we ought to ask why, so that we 
can better understand its true meaning. If there are gaps, we ought to 
explore whether we can fill those gaps in a way that will provide a 
richer conceptualization of the Constitution and its meaning. 
That is my task here: to explore the metaphor of a “living” 
Constitution from a biological perspective and to evaluate whether the 
metaphor employs those biological implications correctly. I examine 
where the metaphor loses significance, how far the metaphor might 
extend, and what this all tells us about the way we envision, 
conceptualize, and understand our Constitution. 
In the process, I hope to shift both debates alluded to above. A 
more detailed understanding of biology may allow us to better 
appreciate the nuances of the metaphor of a “living” Constitution. 
Further, a fuller appreciation of the role biological metaphor can play 
in constitutional doctrine stakes a middle path in the current debate 
about what biology can offer to law. 
 
ST. U. L. REV. 401 (2005); cf. Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 482–83 (describing a rich 
literature on the legal use of evolutionary metaphors). 
 4. See, e.g., Elliott, supra, note 3, at 39 (“I do not mean to imply, however, that [legal 
theories] are based on a correct understanding of evolutionary theory in biology. My central 
concern is the effect that evolutionary ideas have had on legal thought, not whether the lawyers 
got their biology right.”); Herbert Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence, 64 TEX. L. 
REV. 645 (1985). 
 5. For more on the importance of constitutional “vision,” see Thomas P. Crocker, 
Envisioning the Constitution, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 1–8 (2007). 
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Part I has introduced the metaphor of a “living” Constitution, 
posed some preliminary questions about the metaphor, and 
underscored why we ought to care about it. 
Part II frames the concept of the “living” Constitution as a 
powerful biological metaphor characterizing the Constitution as a 
living organism. For example, the “living” Constitution “grows,” 
“develops,” and “evolves” over time. These and other conventional 
expressions of the metaphor evince a purposeful use of biological 
terms to conceptualize living constitutionalism and an inextricable 
link between the “living” Constitution and biological notions. 
Part III critically analyzes the metaphor from a biological 
perspective. In many respects, living constitutionalism is true to the 
biology it uses. Organisms grow, for example, much in the same way 
that the Constitution “grows” under the theory of living 
constitutionalism. These similarities help strengthen the metaphor 
and increase the likelihood that those who use and hear it understand 
it. In other respects, however, the metaphor has fundamental gaps 
and is surprisingly inconsistent. For example, the “evolution” of the 
“living” Constitution does not undergo a process akin to Darwinian 
natural selection. Instead constitutional evolution is far more like 
artificial selection or even Intelligent Design. Understanding why 
leads to a richer understanding of and appreciation for the “living” 
Constitution. 
Part IV then turns to some gaps in the metaphor and embarks 
on the preliminary, but ambitious, task of filling those gaps by 
extending the metaphor in ways that are consistent with biological 
understandings. The results are both surprising and promising, and I 
make some suggestions for intriguing avenues of deeper 
conceptualization. For example, conceptualizing the various clauses of 
the Constitution as genes in a body can lead to a fuller understanding 
of how the parts relate to the whole. This Part also acknowledges the 
dangers of extending the metaphor and of extending biology beyond 
the life sciences, but ultimately concludes that careful use can enrich 
discussion and understanding of our Constitution, both for those who 
accept the notion of a “living” constitution and for those who do not. 
II. THE METAPHOR OF A “LIVING” CONSTITUTION 
My task in this section is to explore the biological facets of the 
metaphor “living” Constitution. At the outset, let me say what this 
task will not entail. I will not make a normative argument for or 
against living constitutionalism. Nor will I be so bold as to attempt to 
construct a single, unified, internally consistent account of living 
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constitutionalism, which, aside from being tangential to my analysis, 
might well be impossible.6 Instead, I will provide a descriptive account 
of the metaphor of a “living” Constitution, paying particular attention 
to the biological terms used to describe it. 
If a metaphor can be written as A IS B,7 then the metaphor of 
living constitutionalism can be written as THE CONSTITUTION IS AN 
ORGANISM. Many prominent constitutional theorists have expressed 
this metaphor explicitly. For example, Woodrow Wilson wrote: 
“[G]overnment is not a machine, but a living thing. It falls, not under 
the theory of the universe, but under the theory of organic life.”8 
Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote that the provisions of the Constitution 
“are organic, living institutions.”9 Charles Beard wrote, “The 
Constitution as practice is a living thing.”10 Arthur Selwyn Miller 
wrote that the Constitution “is a ‘living’ document.”11 James Thayer 
also expressly characterized the Constitution as organic.12 Although 
Progressives may have popularized the metaphor,13 some modern 
theorists, such as Keith Whittington, adhere to it.14 
 
 6. As Justice William Rehnquist once wrote, “The phrase living constitution has about it a 
teasing imprecision that makes it a coat of many colors.” William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a 
Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 693 (1976); see also Antonin Scalia, Common-Law 
Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the 
Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 45 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (“[T]he 
evolutionists divide into as many camps as there are individual views of the good, the true, and 
the beautiful.”); cf. Arthur Selwyn Miller, Notes on the Concept of the “Living” Constitution, 31 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 881, 884 (1963) (“The concept of the ‘living Constitution’ has never been 
explained in detail so as to indicate how far it goes and what it means.”). 
 7. I borrow this style from Lakoff and Johnson’s seminal work on conceptual metaphor. 
See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980). 
 8. WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 56–57 
(1908). For a comprehensive exposition of the “machine” metaphor, see MICHAEL KAMMEN, A 
MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1986). 
 9. Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914). 
 10. Charles Beard, The Living Constitution, 185 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 29, 31 
(1936). 
 11. Miller, supra note 6, at 884. 
 12. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional 
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). 
 13. Howard Gillman, The Collapse of Constitutional Originalism, 11 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 
191, 215 (1997) (“[T]he Progressives spearheaded the shift from using Newtonian metaphors to 
describe the Constitution to using Darwinian metaphors, or more specifically, the shift away 
from viewing the Constitution as a reliable and durable mechanism toward viewing it as an 
organism.”). 
 14. Keith E. Whittington, It’s Alive! The Persistence of the Constitution, 11 GOOD SOC’Y 8, 9 
(2002) (cautioning that “too much can be made of the biological metaphors,” but agreeing that 
“the Constitution is a living organism”), available at http://www.princeton.edu/~kewhitt/its 
_alive.pdf#search+’constitution%20is%20a%20living%20organism’. 
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The incorporation of recognizable traits of living (and 
sometimes human) organisms deepens the general metaphor. The 
“living” Constitution was “born,”15 it was “nurtured”16 as it 
“developed”17 into “maturity,”18 and it continues to “grow” with 
society.19 Its provisions have a capacity to “adapt” to social changes.20 
It has been called a “tap-root”21 that “grew” in the “soil” of a particular 
time but which can be “transplant[ed]” to the “soil” of different times.22 
With help, it can “survive.”23 Eric Claeys has put it this way: “Like an 
animal, a constitutional order must adapt or die.”24 
If these descriptions were not enough, additional metaphorical 
extensions abound. For example, the Constitution has an animating 
“spirit”25 or “vitality.”26 It has organic structure, with a “skin[],”27 
 
 15. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472–73 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(alluding to the “birth” of constitutional principles); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) 
(finding that the Framers “called into life a being the development of which could not have been 
foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters”); see also Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. 
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442–43 (1934) (adopting an evolving characterization of the 
Constitution); Thurgood Marshall, The Constitution: A Living Document, 30 HOW. L.J. 915, 919 
(1987) (alluding to its “birth”). 
 16. Marshall, supra note 15, at 919; see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond our 
Borders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 22 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 329, 337 (2004) (“In conclusion, my cheers as you undertake the challenging mission 
to support and nurture the Constitution, as it has evolved over the span of two centuries and 
more.”). 
 17. HOWARD LEE MCBAIN, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION: A CONSIDERATION OF THE REALITIES 
AND LEGENDS OF OUR FUNDAMENTAL LAW 11 (1927); see also id. at 25 (“[The Constitution] has 
developed. It has been altered and enlarged by several different methods. The [C]onstitution has 
developed by the growth of customs and especially the customs or practises of political parties.”). 
 18. 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1-16, 81–82 (3d ed. 2000) 
(“[T]he bare words of the Constitution’s text and the skeletal structure on which those words 
were hung, only begin to fill out the Constitution as a mature, ongoing system of constitutional 
law.”). 
 19. WILSON, supra note 8, at 22; First Presidential Debate between George W. Bush and Al 
Gore, 2000 WL 1466168 (ABC, Oct. 3, 2000) (“[T]he Constitution ought to be interpreted as a 
document that grows with our country and our history.”), available at http://abcnews.go. 
com/Politics/Story?id=122806&page=1. 
 20. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 472 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 21. WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 28–
30 (Meridian Books 1956) (1885). 
 22. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639–40 (1943); Gompers v. United 
States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914). 
 23. Miller, supra note 6, at 885, 912. 
 24. Eric R. Claeys, The Living Commerce Clause: Federalism in Progressive Political Theory 
and the Commerce Clause after Lopez and Morrison, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 403, 449 
(2002). 
 25. WILSON, supra note 8, at 69 (“[The Constitution is not] a mere lawyer’s document: It is a 
vehicle for life, and its spirit is always the spirit of the age.”). 
 26. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958) (asserting that the provisions of the Constitution 
“are vital, living principles”); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
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“skelet[on],”28 and “body and blood.”29 It “palpitat[es],”30 has “health,”31 
and can “atrophy.”32 Akhil Amar recently wrote a “biography” of it, 
painting a “portrait” that reflects its “personality” and “deep 
convictions.”33 And, those who do not believe in a “living” Constitution 
are portrayed as believing in a “dead”34 or “lifeless”35 one. 
Thus, the metaphor THE CONSTITUTION IS AN ORGANISM is a 
rich one,36 full of biological implications. But does the metaphor hold 
up from a biological perspective? And where does it take us? Those are 
questions I turn to next. 
III. EVALUATING THE METAPHOR 
To evaluate the metaphor, I will look both at the ways it 
accurately captures its own biological implications and at the ways it 
does not (yet). In addition, I will take one strong feature of the 
metaphor—the idea that the “living” Constitution “evolves”—and 
explore what type of evolution the metaphor contemplates and what 
that might mean for our conception of a “living” Constitution. 
 
dissenting) (“Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the 
mischief which gave it birth.”); Gompers, 233 U.S. at 610 (“[T]he provisions of the Constitution 
and the amendments . . . are not mathematical formulas . . . . [T]hey are organic living 
institutions . . . . [T]heir significance is vital not formal.”). 
 27. Miller, supra note 6, at 885. 
 28. 1 TRIBE, supra note 18, at 81–82 (“[T]he bare words of the Constitution’s text and the 
skeletal structure on which those words were hung, only begin to fill out the Constitution as a 
mature, ongoing system of constitutional law.”). 
 29. EDWARD S. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AS AN 
INSTRUMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT 68 (1938). 
 30. Edward S. Corwin, Constitution v. Constitutional Theory, 19 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 290, 
303 (1925). 
 31. CORWIN, supra note 29, at 127. 
 32. Charles A. Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARV. L. REV. 673, 
735–36 (1963). 
 33. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 471 (2005). 
 34. Saby Ghoshray, To Understand Foreign Court Citation: Dissecting Originalism, 
Dynamism, Romanticism, and Consequentialism, 69 ALA. L. REV. 709, 722 (2006). 
 35. HERMAN BELZ, A LIVING CONSTITUTION OR FUNDAMENTAL LAW? 238 (1998); see also 
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution is Not “Hard Law”: The Bork Rejection and the Future of 
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 6 CONST. COMMENT. 29, 37–38 (1989). 
 36. It is rich enough that even those who disagree with the existence of a “living” 
Constitution nonetheless understand the metaphor. See, e.g., Scalia blasts critics of “living 
Constitution,” ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 14, 2006), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11346274; see 
also Antonin Scalia, Constitutional Interpretation the Old Fashioned Way, Remarks at the 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Mar. 14, 2005), available at 
http://www.cfif.org/htdocs/freedomline/current/guest_commentary/scalia-constitutional-
speech.htm. 
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A. Metaphorical Accuracies and Gaps 
To those who ascribe to it, the metaphor THE CONSTITUTION IS 
AN ORGANISM accurately parallels biological understanding in many 
ways. For example, biologists generally agree that living organisms 
have structure; that they develop, grow, and repair themselves; and 
that they respond to environmental changes and are the subject of 
evolution.37 Thus, it is entirely consistent to describe a “living” 
Constitution as having skin, skeleton, body, and blood; as developing, 
maturing, and growing; as changing, adapting, and evolving; and as 
having the capacity to be healthy and to atrophy.38 
In other ways, however, the metaphor currently lacks 
analogues to fundamental characteristics of living things. Biologists 
generally agree that living organisms use raw materials from their 
environment for energy.39 I have found no conventional expression of 
living constitutionalism that adopts this feature of biology. Similarly, 
living organisms reproduce.40 Again, I have found no conventional 
expression of reproduction.41 Finally, living organisms have a 
definitive life cycle, punctuated by senescence and death.42 Living 
constitutionalism has no analogue for this life cycle. Indeed, living 
constitutionalism holds something of the opposite—that change can 
prevent the Constitution from growing old and dying. In short, these 
accepted and fundamental features of living organisms find no 
metaphorical expression in living constitutionalism. 
There are at least two responses to the identification of these 
“gaps.” The first response is that metaphor is not meant to be (and, in 
fact, is the opposite of) identity. The Constitution is not actually a 
living biological organism; indeed, it is obviously and fundamentally 
unlike a living organism in many ways. The metaphor merely links 
the two objects according to certain similarities, not according to all 
 
 37. See ERNST MAYR, THIS IS BIOLOGY: THE SCIENCE OF THE LIVING WORLD 21–22 (1997); 
NANCY L. PRUITT & LARRY S. UNDERWOOD, BIOINQUIRY: MAKING CONNECTIONS IN BIOLOGY 8 (3d 
ed. 2006); IRWIN W. SHERMAN & VILIA G. SHERMAN, BIOLOGY: A HUMAN APPROACH 5 (4th ed. 
1989); J. ARTHUR THOMASON & PATRICK GEDDES, LIFE: OUTLINES OF GENERAL BIOLOGY 12–29 
(1931); PAUL B. WEISZ, THE SCIENCE OF BIOLOGY 22 (3d ed. 1967). 
 38. See supra text accompanying notes 15–35. 
 39. See supra note 37. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Glenn Reynolds comes close when he likens democracy to sex, though he does so only 
through a single common effect—resistance to parasites—and without engaging the metaphor of 
a living Constitution. See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Is Democracy Like Sex?, 48 VAND. L. REV. 
1635, 1637–38 (1995). 
 42. MAYR, supra note 37, at 22. 
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traits. And so, this first response goes, gaps are not fatal to the 
metaphor. 
This truism is a cop-out of sorts, a shortcut to avoid the second 
response to the gaps: rather than accept the gaps and passing them off 
as the byproduct of metaphor, perhaps we can use our understanding 
of the metaphor to fill them. For example, does living 
constitutionalism really lack an analogue for death? Perhaps not; 
perhaps the Constitution does have a life cycle in which it continually 
dies as society’s needs outpace it and is reborn with updated 
modifications in a constant dialogue with We the People.43 The point is 
that creative thought may reveal appropriate and meaningful 
analogues for the gaps that currently exist in the metaphor. 
Filling those gaps is an exciting part of thinking deeply about 
the metaphor, and I will return to this task in the next Part to explore 
some of the ways in which extending the metaphor can shed light on 
our conception of the Constitution. But first, I must acknowledge a 
different, and more serious, kind of flaw. Not only does the metaphor 
have gaps, but it also has potential inaccuracies. 
B. Constitutional Evolution? 
One prominent component of the metaphor THE CONSTITUTION 
IS AN ORGANISM is evolution. The Constitution “changes” and “evolves” 
over time in order to meet the needs of society.44 Not all evolutionary 
 
 43. Indeed, others have argued expressly that constitutions have life cycles and “mortality 
rates.” See Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, The Lifespan of Written 
Constitutions (on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review) (arguing that the mortality rate of 
constitutions is influenced by executive overreaching in response to external shocks such as wars 
and other crises). 
 44. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(writing that constitutional provisions “must have a . . . capacity of adaptation to a changing 
world”); ARTHUR SELWYN MILLER, SOCIAL CHANGES AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW: AMERICA’S 
EVOLVING CONSTITUTION 349 (1979) (“The idea of the living Constitution thus is a justification 
for adaptation of the basic document to fit new social exigencies.”); JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION 
BY JUDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 9 (2005) (“A living 
Constitution (it is said) must evolve and adapt to contemporary needs and values.”); William J. 
Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, Address at 
Georgetown University, Text & Teaching Symposium (Oct. 12, 1985), reprinted in 26 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 433, 438 (1986) (“For the genius of the Constitution rests not in any static meaning it might 
have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great principles to cope 
with current problems and current needs.”); Chemerinsky, supra note 35, at 37–38 (“The modern 
activist Court [stood] between legislative supremacy that threatened to overrule fundamental 
values embodied in the Constitution and the rule of a static and lifeless Constitution incapable of 
changing and evolving by interpretation.”); Edward S. Corwin, Statement of March 17, 1937 
Before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Court Reorganization, in AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY 134, 134 (Alpheus T. Mason & Gerald Garvey eds., 1964) (charging the Court of the 
early 1930s as turning its back upon a Constitution that “adapts . . . to present needs”); 
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models are Darwinian,45 but this one is. The metaphor of a “living” 
Constitution did not arise before Darwin, despite the long history and 
influence of the concept of the “living law.”46 When living 
constitutionalism did arise, it was promoted by advocates like 
Woodrow Wilson, who were heavily influenced by Darwinist 
evolutionary thought.47 Wilson even made the focus of the metaphor 
explicit: “[G]overnment . . . is accountable to Darwin, not to Newton. It 
is modified by its environment, necessitated by its tasks, shaped to its 
functions by the sheer pressure of life. . . . Living political 
constitutions must be Darwinian in structure and practice.”48 This is 
consistent with the metaphor THE CONSTITUTION IS AN ORGANISM: 
living things are subject to Darwinian evolutionary pressures. Thus, 
the “living” Constitution does not “evolve” in a vernacular sense but in 
the Darwinian sense. 
Under Darwin’s theory of evolution,49 individuals of various 
genetic makeups compete under environmental pressures such as 
scarcity of food or shelter, and those with less-favored genetic 
makeups generally lose out to those with more-favored genetic 
makeups. The winners reproduce and pass on their favored genetic 
makeups to their offspring.50 As a result, the genetic pool in the 
population shifts.51 When one population’s genetic makeup has so 
 
Ginsburg, supra note 16, at 337 (“In conclusion, my cheers as you undertake the challenging 
mission to support and nurture the Constitution, as it has evolved over the span of two centuries 
and more.”); Scalia, supra note 6, at 38 (calling living constitutionalism “a body of law that . . . 
grows and changes from age to age, in order to meet the needs of a changing society”). 
 45. See Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 646–47 (providing an overview of evolutionary models 
of jurisprudence, including non-Darwinian models); Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 479 
(“The word ‘evolution’ is frequently used in everyday speech to convey the idea simply of change, 
or of nonrandom change.”). 
 46. See, e.g., SIR EDWARD COKE, Second Institute, Magna Charta, in 2 SELECTED WRITINGS 
OF SIR EDWARD COKE  801 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003) (“Now as out of the old fields must come 
the new corne, so our old books do excellently expound, and expresse this matter, as the Law is 
holden at this day.”). 
 47. Morton J. Horwitz, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term—Foreword: The Constitution of 
Change: Legal Fundamentality with Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 51–54 (1993) 
(describing the influence of Darwinism on Wilson and other Progressives). 
 48. WILSON, supra note 8, at 56–57; see also WOODROW WILSON, THE NEW FREEDOM 46–48 
(1913) (“All that progressives ask or desire is permission . . . to interpret the Constitution 
according to the Darwinian principle . . . .”). 
 49. Although Darwinist adherents themselves are split on some of its nuances, see Michael 
Ruse, Darwinism, in KEYWORDS OF EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 74 (Evelyn Fox Keller & Elisabeth 
A. Lloyd eds., 1992), I mean to set forth here some fundamentals that exhibit less internal 
disagreement among scientific adherents. 
 50. CHARLES DARWIN, ORIGIN OF SPECIES 39, 107–08 (1859). 
 51. STEPHEN JAY GOULD, HEN’S TEETH AND HORSE’S TOES 334 (1983). 
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shifted from another population’s makeup that the two cannot 
reproduce among each other, they have become two different species.52 
There are some obvious gaps in the metaphor here. Living 
constitutionalism lacks clear analogues for variation, reproduction, 
competition, and populations. As I mentioned above, however, deeper 
exploration of these characteristics of evolution may lead to some 
surprising discoveries, about which I will have more to say in the next 
Part. 
In addition, the unit of constitutional evolution is unclear. In 
biology, individual organisms may grow and develop, but only species 
evolve. In living constitutionalism, the Constitution appears to have 
attributes of both. 
A little inaccuracy here is not fatal, in my view. After all, 
metaphor is not identity, and some play in the metaphorical joints is 
necessary to give the metaphor its richest meaning. We should use 
this flexibility to enhance our own understanding—perhaps the formal 
amendment process is more like the growth and development of an 
individual organism, while interpretative developments and changed 
meanings over time are akin to evolution—but we should not let the 
mere presence of an inaccuracy sidetrack the goal of greater 
understanding.53 
As an example of what I mean by capitalizing on the 
inaccuracies as points of departure for deeper discussion, I will explore 
another point here: What kind of evolution does the metaphor evoke? 
The question (and its answer) is provocative. 
1. By Natural Selection  
Despite Woodrow Wilson’s sentiments supporting it,54 the 
wrong answer is Darwinian natural selection. To show why, I must 
explain a little about natural selection, which is a two-step process. 
In the first step, genetic variation among individual organisms 
arises without direction and without purpose. For example, if global 
temperatures drop and increased body hair would provide warmth and 
enhance survival, animals will not somehow perceive the need and 
 
 52. DARWIN, supra note 50, at 649; MAYR, supra note 37, at 182–89. 
 53. Indeed, separating out the notions of a “living” Constitution that grows by amendment 
and the “living” Constitution that evolves by judicial reinterpretation may have metaphorical 
appeal across the political spectrum; originalists can advocate for a metaphor that restricts living 
constitutionalism to an organism-based focus, and liberals can advocate for a species-based 
metaphor. There is much to be explored here, and perhaps my efforts will serve as the 
springboard for their development in a larger project. 
 54. See supra note 48. 
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thereby grow body hair. To the contrary, the mutation rate for body 
hair is independent of the environment, and some individuals may be 
born with a genetic makeup that causes them to have less body hair 
than their parents.55 In addition, variation is path dependent. Because 
of its historical evolutionary path, grass cannot suddenly grow hair, 
even if it would be ideal for the grass in light of impending cold.56 
Thus, it is possible that the random variation that occurs will not 
produce any capacity for increased body hair in a particular species. 
The point is that variation is unoriented, constrained by morphology, 
and completely independent of environmental pressures.57 
In the second step of natural selection, the environment then 
exerts pressures that cause competition among the genetic variants. 
The result is that those variants that happen to be best adapted to the 
local environment tend to survive and reproduce more copies of 
themselves, ultimately reducing variation.58 Importantly, the success 
of a variant is dependent solely on the whims of the local environment, 
and that environment has no goal of progress or inherent worth in 
mind. And, because the environment itself and the selection pressures 
within it are themselves protean and somewhat random, an organism 
that may be well adapted in one time and place may go extinct in 
another.59 In short, selection results only in local (and temporary) 
adaptation. 
Take these two steps together, and a couple of conclusions 
arise. First, natural selection is not a progressive, optimizing force in 
which a more advanced species replaces its outdated ancestors.60 
Variation can go in both directions, and which direction is favored 
depends upon the local environment. The relatively hairless elephants 
that evolved as the ice ages ended are not inherently superior to their 
antecedent woolly mammoths. They just happen to have found the 
 
 55. See RICHARD DAWKINS, RIVER OUT OF EDEN 3 (1995) (“It is not success that makes good 
genes. It is good genes that make success . . . .”). 
 56. RICHARD DAWKINS, THE BLIND WATCHMAKER 45 (1986); STEPHEN JAY GOULD, AN 
URCHIN IN THE STORM 45–46 (1987); WEISZ, supra note 37, at 783–84. 
 57. STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE PANDA’S THUMB 79 (1980). 
 58. GOULD, supra note 51, at 334; GOULD, supra note 56, at 213 n.1, 232; MAYR, supra note 
37, at 188–89. 
 59. GOULD, supra note 51, at 343–44. For example, the Permian extinction, 225 million 
years ago, wiped out over 80% of all species. The likely cause was the coalescence of all the 
Earth’s dry land into a single continent, Pangaea, which caused dramatic and rapid changes in 
the Earth’s environment. The changes were too dramatic and too rapid for evolution to keep pace 
with, and, as a consequence, most species died. STEPHEN JAY GOULD, EVER SINCE DARWIN, 135–
38 (1977). 
 60. GOULD, EVER SINCE DARWIN, supra note 59, at 45; GOULD, supra note 51, at 338; 
STEPHEN JAY GOULD, I HAVE LANDED 338 (2002); E. RAY LANKESTER, DEGENERATION: A 
CHAPTER IN DARWINISM 60 (1880). 
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current favor of a very fickle Mother Earth.61 It may very well be that 
the next ice age will again favor woolly-mammoth-like pachyderms 
over their now dominant hairless kin.62 There is no such thing as a 
perfect species, and humans are not the long-term culmination of 
evolutionary progress.63 As Stephen Jay Gould put it, “The Darwinian 
mechanism includes no concept of general progress or universal 
betterment.”64 
Second, natural selection is not forward looking or directed but 
is backward looking and undirected.65 Organisms do not look to the 
future and change themselves in anticipation. Rather, the 
environment looks at the organisms and picks out which ones just 
happen to be best adapted at the time.66 
Thus, natural selection is random, undirected, nonprogressive, 
and indifferent. It has no purpose, no design, and no perfection. As 
Richard Dawkins put it, “The process of trial and error, completely 
unplanned and on the massive scale of natural selection, can be 
expected to be clumsy, wasteful, and blundering.”67 
That’s a far cry from the evolutionary concept of a “living” 
Constitution. The metaphor of a “living” Constitution was initially 
used to support a constitutional evolution that was progressive and for 
the betterment of society.68 The “living” Constitution was designed to 
 
 61. DAWKINS, supra note 55, at 132–33. 
 62. STEPHEN JAY GOULD, FULL HOUSE 139 (1996). For more on the flip-flop of fitness among 
species, see JONATHAN WEINER, THE BEAK OF THE FINCH: A STORY OF EVOLUTION IN OUR TIME 
104–06 (1994). 
 63. DAWKINS, supra note 56, at 50 (“There is no long-distance target, no final perfection to 
serve as a criterion for selection, although human vanity cherishes the absurd notion that our 
species is the final goal of evolution.”); GOULD, supra note 62, at 15, 18; GOULD, supra note 51, at 
246. Indeed, as Gould points out, this is not, and will never be, the Age of Man: “[L]ife has 
always been, and will probably always remain . . . in the Age of Bacteria.” GOULD, supra note 62, 
at 33, 176. 
 64. GOULD, I HAVE LANDED, supra note 60, at 340. 
 65. Michael S. Fried, The Evolution of Legal Concepts: The Memetic Perspective, 39 
JURIMETRICS J. 291, 293 (1999):  
A common fallacy regarding natural selection is the supposition that the 
evolutionary process progresses inexorably toward some pre-ordained goal. 
Darwinian development is sometimes popularly conceived as a gradual 
movement toward perfection; evolution is assumed to progress inexorably 
toward the achievement of ever more sophisticated and highly developed 
organisms. In fact, natural selection is backward-looking. 
 66. DAWKINS, supra note 56, at 5 (“Natural selection, the blind, unconscious, automatic 
process which Darwin discovered . . . has no purpose in mind. It has no mind and no mind’s eye. 
It does not plan for the future. It has no vision, no foresight, no sight at all.”). 
 67. RICHARD DAWKINS, A DEVIL’S CHAPLAIN 8 (2003). 
 68. See, e.g., J.B. BURY, THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1920); Marshall, supra note 15, at 919–20 
(lauding the progress made since the Founding and indicating that the progress is a “promising 
evolution” towards betterment that has not yet been fully realized); Steve Sheppard, The State 
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effectuate the Preamble’s declaration of a desire for “a more perfect 
Union,” more extensive “Justice” and “Tranquility,” and more secure 
“Blessings of Liberty.”69 The Supreme Court itself has picked up on 
this idea, first noting that the invalidation of state laws under the Due 
Process Clause helped to ensure the “progress [and] improvement” of 
the Constitution.70 Later, the Court reiterated that the Constitution is 
“progressive” and stated that it acquires meaning as public opinion 
becomes more “enlightened by humane justice.”71 Finally, the Court 
famously proclaimed that the Eighth Amendment must draw meaning 
from the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society.”72 In each case, the “living” Constitution’s evolution 
is not haphazard or random but is progressive; the Constitution 
reaches towards enlightenment and improvement. That is 
emphatically not the case for natural selection. 
The metaphor of a “living” Constitution does not represent the 
Progressive view exclusively. Bruce Ackerman and others have used it 
to support the democratic principle that popular support justifies 
changed constitutional meaning.73 Under this view, the changes in the 
Constitution are directed by the people to keep up with the changing 
needs of society.74 The Constitution is “update[ed],”75 “modified,”76 and 
 
Interest in the Good Citizen: Constitutional Balance between the Citizen and the Perfectionist 
State, 45 HASTINGS L. J. 969, 1010 n.146 (1994) (describing progress towards an increasingly 
better life). Not all living constitutionalists find this view persuasive. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, 
The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1754 (2007) (“For me, the ‘living constitution’ is 
not a convenient slogan for transforming our very imperfect Constitution into something better 
than it is.”). 
 69. See Corwin, supra note 30, at 302 (discussing constitutional interpretation and the 
Preamble). 
 70. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 529 (1884). 
 71. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910). 
 72. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958). 
 73. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 68, at 1754 (noting the importance of popular 
sovereignty to changes in constitutional meaning); William J. Brennan, Jr., Presentation to the 
American Bar Association (July 9, 1985), in AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 607, 610 (Alpheus 
Thomas Mason & Donald Grier Stephenson eds., 8th ed. 1987) (referring to “contemporary 
ratification”); Ethan J. Leib, The Perpetual Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST. 
COMMENT. 353, 363 (2007) (“The document and our life under it always needs justification 
morally, practically, and politically – and living constitutionalism always requires us to ask for 
that justification at the very moment when we ask for the meaning of the document and its 
provisions.”). 
 74. Miller, supra note 6, at 885 (explaining that the cause of constitutional change is the 
people and the instrument is the Court); see also G. Edward White, The “Constitutional 
Revolution” as a Crisis in Adaptivity, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 874–75 (1997) (describing the role of 
legal realism in promoting the belief that people could change the law to keep pace with society). 
 75. Miller, supra note 6, at 886. 
 76. White, supra note 74, at 874. 
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“adapted”77 by the people or the courts rather than selected by an 
agenda-less environment. It relies on “the purposive activities of 
human actors as shaping forces in the universe.”78 In other words, the 
people purposefully change constitutional meaning with the goal of 
better fitting the environment, rather than the environment selecting 
whatever happens to be the most adapted meaning at the time. 
Constitutional evolution is active and directed, not passive. As I have 
discussed, natural selection—undirected, purposeless, and backward 
looking—is exactly the opposite. 
2. Other Options  
If the “evolution” of the “living” Constitution does not reflect 
Darwin’s natural selection, then what does it reflect? Two possible 
answers come to mind. 
a. Artificial Selection  
Not all Darwinian evolution occurs through natural selection. 
Darwin also coined the term “artificial selection” to refer to a process 
similar to natural selection except that the selecting agents are 
human rather than the natural environment.79 Thus, in artificial 
selection, human influence forms the dominant selection pressure. 
Artificial selection occurs in many domesticated species.80 Man 
has artificially selected for beauty in pigeons, speed in greyhounds, 
and taste in tomatoes. In each case, the artificial selection was 
directed and progressive. Artificial selection is far more reflective of 
the evolution of the “living” Constitution than haphazard and 
indifferent natural selection. Artificial selection is still suboptimal 
because variation must work with what it has, and the process is still 
backward looking because the human selecting agents must sift 
through the offspring to eliminate the less desirable individuals. But 
artificial selection describes constitutional evolution better than 
natural selection. 
If artificial selection is the agent of change for the “living” 
Constitution, what might that tell us? At this depth in the metaphor, 
 
 77. Brennan, supra note 44, at 445; see also MILLER, supra note 44, at 349 (stating that the 
Constitution is adapted to fit new social problems); RUBENFELD, supra note 44, at 10 (“If we 
believed in the living Constitution, we would ask whether our courts had generated doctrine well 
adapted to the country’s needs.”). 
 78. White, supra note 74, at 873. 
 79. DARWIN, supra note 50, at 7–43. 
 80. PAUL B. WEISZ, THE SCIENCE OF BIOLOGY 778–79 (3d ed. 1967). 
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many gaps arise, but let me at least hazard some preliminary 
thoughts. 
Artificial selection distributes variation very differently than 
natural selection. In the wild, genetic variation is spread among and 
within individuals. Thus, the phenotypes of individuals are all 
relatively similar, with mostly minor differences. In domesticated 
species, however, the variation is focused in different breeds, and 
within a breed, variation is minimized. Thus, a population of wolves 
may have all of the genetic variation existing in domestic dogs, but a 
population of golden retrievers has far less genetic variation. As a 
population, then, wolves are far more likely to survive when 
confronted with random environmental pressures than are golden 
retrievers, for the likelihood that an individual wolf will have an 
adapted genetic makeup is greater.81 
To make matters worse for the golden retriever, man is often 
short sighted and fallible in his artificial selection.82 Nature “sees” the 
entire organism and therefore may select for an interconnected 
complex of traits, some of which may be invisible but nevertheless 
important to survival. Humans, on the other hand, only “see” what 
they can perceive, and the view of artificial selection is particularly 
narrow.83 The result is unconscious selection—when artificial selection 
results in major changes that are not anticipated.84 
Thus, a gardener who selects for thornless roses may indeed 
succeed in quickly breeding a variety of thornless rose, but he may be 
surprised to learn that, in the process, he also has unwittingly bred 
out of the roses their natural resistance to disease. Similarly, that 
golden retrievers suffer from an unusually high incidence of hip 
problems is a result of artificial selection.85 
In short, artificial selection works quite well at creating 
organisms specifically tailored to a particular goal in a relatively short 
 
 81. EDWARD O. PRICE, ANIMAL DOMESTICATION AND BEHAVIOR 36 (2002). For more on the 
deleterious effects of inbreeding, see D.S. FALCONER & T.F.C. MACKAY, INTRODUCTION TO 
QUANTITATIVE GENETICS (1996); T.F.C. MacKay, A Quantitative Genetic Analysis of Fitness and 
Its Components in Drosophila Melanogaster, 47 GENETICS RES. 59–70 (1985). 
 82. L.T. Evans, Darwin’s Use of the Analogy Between Artificial and Natural Selection, 17 J. 
HIST. OF BIOLOGY 113, 132 (1984) (“Man selects only what is useful and curious—has bad 
judgement [sic], is capricious—grudges to destroy those that do not come up to his pattern . . . 
does not select those best adapted to the conditions under which the form lives, but those most 
useful to him.”). 
 83. DARWIN, supra note 50, at 83–84 (“Man can act only on external and visible 
characters . . . . [Nature] can act on every internal organ, on every share of constitutional 
difference, on the whole machinery of life.”). 
 84. James A. Secord, Nature’s Fancy: Charles Darwin and the Breeding of Pigeons, 72 ISIS 
162, 183–84 (1981). 
 85. PRICE, supra note 81, at 35–36. 
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period of time,86 but it often comes with unintended consequences.87 
Charles Darwin put it this way: “How fleeting are the wishes and 
efforts of man?  How short his time?  And consequently, how poor will 
his products be, compared with those accumulated by nature during 
whole geological periods.”88 
If, therefore, the evolution of the “living” Constitution is akin to 
artificial selection, artificial selection may have something to tell us 
about tinkering with the document toward a narrow goal. It may be 
that the human-driven changes in the Constitution are just as short 
sighted and fallible as in artificial selection, yielding unintended 
consequences. 
b. Intelligent Design  
Artificial selection is perhaps a better analogue in the 
metaphor, because it accounts for constitutional evolution’s direction 
and progressive advancement. But artificial selection does not explain 
fully the forward-looking nature and non-randomness of the 
constitutional changes. In some respects, We the People exercise 
control not only over the selection process, but also over the variation 
step preceding selection. We propose changes in a forward-looking, 
goal-oriented way. Artificial selection—and, indeed, Darwinian 
evolution in general—does not capture this aspect of constitutional 
evolution. 
Perhaps the best analogue, then, is not scientific at all but 
quasi-religious: Intelligent Design.89 Intelligent Design posits that 
certain features of living things are best explained by an intelligent 
cause, not an undirected, chance-based process such as Darwinian 
evolution.90 The Intelligent Design movement does not deny that 
 
 86. Michael S. Fried, The Evolution of Legal Concepts: The Memetic Perspective, 39 
JURIMETRICS J. 291, 292 (1999). For example, all of the various types of dogs have been created 
from wolves by artificial selection in only a few thousand years. RICHARD DAWKINS, CLIMBING 
MOUNT IMPROBABLE 21–23 (1996). 
 87. Evans, supra note 82, at 132. 
 88. DARWIN, supra note 50, at 84. 
 89. To make my own position clear, a disclaimer is warranted: I emphatically believe that 
Intelligent Design is neither a segment of biology nor in any sense a scientific theory. See 
Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 722 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (“[C]ompelling 
evidence strongly supports Plaintiffs’ assertion that [Intelligent Design] is creationism re-
labeled.”). See generally ROBERT T. PENNOCK, TOWER OF BABEL: THE EVIDENCE AGAINST THE 
NEW CREATIONISM (1999) (presenting a history and criticism of Creationism). But what may be 
properly disparaged as science may be more acceptable as a metaphor. 
 90. Intelligent Design and Evolution Awareness Center, http://www.ideacenter.org 
/contentmgr/showdetails.php/id/1136 (last visited Aug. 28, 2008); Intelligent Design Network, 
DODSON_PAGE 10/28/2008 12:33:49 AM 
1336 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:5:1319 
evolution has occurred; it proposes that evolution has occurred at the 
direction of an intelligent and prescient source. In contrast to natural 
selection, Intelligent Design sees all stages of evolution as forward 
looking, progressive, and directed. 
Two features of living constitutionalism suggest that the 
“living” Constitution is closely analogous to Intelligent Design. First, 
the Progressives’ view of advancement and betterment combined with 
Bruce Ackerman’s view of popularly directed change leads to the 
conclusion that the American people are the (presumably intelligent) 
driving force behind the purposeful and directed changes to our 
constitutional order. The people, with benign foresight, direct 
constitutional evolution for the advancement and betterment of 
society. That kind of evolution is more like Intelligent Design than 
natural, or even artificial, selection. 
Second, the quasi-religious nature of Intelligent Design 
complements the reverence of living constitutionalism. The “living” 
Constitution “has a mystical significance for the American people—an 
object of reverence and awe that projects a quasi-religious fervor to 
aspects of secular life.”91 It performs the “vastly important function of 
being a unifying symbol.”92 It is “timeless” and it “inspire[s].”93 It 
achieves the Preamble’s promise of “a more perfect Union,” “domestic 
Tranquility,” “general Welfare,” and the “Blessings of Liberty.”94 For 
living constitutionalism, the Constitution is omnipresent and engaged 
in a continuing dialogue with We the People. It is a repository of our 
most fundamental values. In a word, the Constitution is sacred.95 And 
that view is far more consonant with Intelligent Design than with the 
emphatically secular natural selection.96 
 
www.intelligentdesignnetwork.org; see also William S. Harris & John H. Calvert, Intelligent 
Design: The Scientific Alternative to Evolution, NAT’L CATHOLIC BIOETHICS Q. 531, 538 (2003). 
 91. Miller, supra note 6, at 881. 
 92. Id. at 881–82. 
 93. Brennan, supra note 44, at 445. 
 94. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 95. I do not mean to suggest that this sentiment and others expressed in this Section are 
restricted to living constitutionalists. Many who have divergent interpretative views of 
constitutionalism may hold the Constitution with the kind of reverence described here. See 
generally Thomas Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984); Symposium, 
Religious Dimensions of American Constitutionalism, 39 EMORY L.J. 1 (1990). But to the extent 
those views are part of living constitutionalism, their impact on the metaphor is worth studying. 
 96. GOULD, supra note 62, at 20, 29 (arguing that the need to view evolution as progressive 
and designed is a “delusion based on social prejudice and psychological hope engendered by our 
unwillingness to accept [our own inconsequentialism]”). Darwin himself wrote: “What a book a 
Devil’s Chaplain might write on the clumsy, wasteful, blundering low and horridly cruel works of 
nature.” DAWKINS, supra note 67, at 8. Indeed, Darwin is said to have lost his faith because he 
could not fathom a benevolent deity designing creatures such as the digger wasp. A digger wasp 
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c. Hybridization  
Ultimately, it may be that a hybrid of artificial selection and 
Intelligent Design best explains the evolution of a metaphorical 
“living” Constitution. Constitutional evolution is, at all stages, forward 
looking, directed, purposeful, and progressive, like Intelligent Design 
supposes, but is also fallible, imperfect, and short sighted as artificial 
selection can be. 
I need not resolve all of the nuances of this preliminary 
thought here. The important point is that a deeper exploration of the 
metaphor THE CONSTITUTION IS AN ORGANISM can help conceptualize 
and explain how the Constitution “evolves,” and it may even help us 
recognize and anticipate some of the risks that that evolution entails. 
IV. EXTENDING THE METAPHOR 
Part III identified some gaps in the metaphor and hinted that 
deeper thinking about the Constitution from a biological perspective 
may reveal ways to fill those gaps, whether one adheres to the theory 
of living constitutionalism or not. This Part takes up that task in a 
preliminary way, exploring several important extensions of the 
metaphor. I will not defend them in detail, but I hope that opening the 
discussion here will help stimulate debate, reframe issues, and 
improve our overall understanding of constitutional theory. 
The gap I wish to explore here is that if the “living” 
Constitution is an organism, then what are its genes? The current 
expressions of the metaphor lack an analogue for genes, but an 
obvious possibility is that individual clauses are genes. In structural 
respects, this is an entirely accurate portrayal of biology. An 
organism’s genes are its blueprint, just as the clauses are the 
blueprint for the Constitution. But the CLAUSES ARE GENES metaphor 
has the potential to be even more powerful. 
A. Clause Selection 
Some genes remain unchanged through thousands, sometimes 
millions, of generations. There are two competing reasons why a gene 
might exhibit such stasis. First, the gene could be so vitally important 
 
female swoops down on an unsuspecting caterpillar and precisely stings it so that the caterpillar 
is immobilized but alive. Then, she drags the caterpillar back to her underground lair, where she 
lays an egg on it. The egg hatches, and the wasp larva that emerges has a fresh and immobile 
source of nourishment. The caterpillar is eaten alive and may even be cognizant of the fact at the 
time. DAWKINS, supra note 55, at 95. 
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to the organism that any changes would result in death. In such a 
case, natural selection would exert irresistible pressure against 
change. Second, the gene could be so insignificant that natural 
selection exerts almost no pressure to change, and random drift of the 
genetic makeup simply has not occurred. 
The histone H4 gene is an example of the former. It helps 
structure chromosomes, which are strands of genes. It is an incredibly 
crucial gene, for without it, reproduction is impossible. For that 
reason, the gene exists in most species, including humans, and it has 
remained essentially unchanged over at least 1.5 million years. 
Natural selection has preserved it, unchanged, over the course of 
millions of generations because of its vital importance to life.97 
But other genes fall into the latter category at the nadir of 
importance.98 Examples abound in humans—toe hair, wisdom teeth, 
vomeronasal organs,99 and appendices confer so little advantage or 
disadvantage to our reproductive success that natural selection simply 
is indifferent toward them and exerts so little pressure that these 
structures have yet to be eliminated from our bodies.100 
Not all genes are so resistant to change; most DNA is subject to 
natural selection and goes through evolutionary change far more 
frequently. The interesting biological point is that different genes have 
different rates of evolutionary change.101 
As many have recognized, the clauses of the Constitution also 
have different rates of change.102 The Commerce Clause, for example, 
has changed famously over the years, shifting from modestly broad 
 
 97. DAWKINS, supra note 56, at 123–24. 
 98. “Junk DNA” is an extreme example. These strands of DNA have no functionality but 
are just along for the ride, piggybacking on the survival capabilities produced by functional 
genes. RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 47 (1976). By one estimation, 99% of human DNA 
is nonfunctional junk DNA. GOULD, I HAVE LANDED, supra note 60, at 227. 
 99. These are small pits on either side of the septum that contain nonfunctioning 
chemoreceptors, all that is left of a structure that once sensed pheromones. Eric B. Keverne, The 
Vomeronasal Organ, SCIENCE, Oct. 22, 1999, at 716. 
 100. CHARLES DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN 13–15 (1871). 
 101. The view that genes are the units of selection is not universally accepted. Indeed, there 
is a widespread and unresolved debate among evolutionary theorists as to whether natural 
selection operates on the gene, individual, population, or species level. See DAWKINS, supra note 
56, at 255–69; GOULD, supra note 57, at 85–86; GOULD, supra note 56, at 66–67; MAYR, supra 
note 37, at 20, 201; WEISZ, supra note 37, at 770; Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and 
Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 664 (1996); Sewall Wright, Genic and Organismic Selection, 
34 EVOLUTION 825, 825–43 (1980). 
 102. See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1, 36 (1998) (explaining how different provisions of the Constitution reflect different levels 
of historical development and change). 
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(particularly in a negative sense) under the Marshall Court103 to 
rather narrow in the Lochner era,104 to quite broad after the New 
Deal,105 to its present-day flux.106 Other provisions, by contrast, such 
as the Vacancies Clause,107 the Third Amendment,108 or the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,109 have hardly 
changed at all. 
Resort to the metaphor may help explain these differential 
rates of change. I will go out on a limb and say that the Third 
Amendment is more likely the wisdom tooth of the Constitution than 
the histone H4 gene, at least from today’s viewpoint.110 But that is a 
 
 103. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (holding that an act of Congress 
gave full authority to defendants’ vessels to navigate the waters of the United States and that 
the New York state law prohibiting navigation in the state’s waters was repugnant to the 
Constitution and void). 
 104. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 1–6, 17–18 (1895) (holding that 
contracts made by four sugar refining companies were not restraints upon trade or commerce). 
 105. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 
(1941). 
 106. Compare United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down the Violence 
Against Women Act on Commerce Clause grounds), and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 
(1995) (striking down a gun control law on Commerce Clause grounds), with Gonzalez v. Raich, 
545 U.S. 1 (2005) (upholding a federal law banning intrastate use of medical marijuana on 
Commerce Clause grounds). 
 107. The Supreme Court has never construed Article I, Section 2’s Vacancies Clause directly, 
and only one appellate court has applied it. See Jackson v. Ogilvie, 426 F.2d 1333, 1337 (7th Cir. 
1970) (holding that a defendant governor had a duty to issue a writ of election to fill a vacancy of 
a Congressional representative). 
 108. Only one has applied the Third Amendment. See Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957 (2d 
Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court has construed the Third Amendment only in passing or in very 
general terms. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). The Third Amendment in particular is nearly 
universally viewed as the forgotten stepchild of the Constitution. See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, The 
Third Amendment: Forgotten but Not Gone, 2 WM & MARY BILL RTS. J. 117, 117 (1993) (stating 
that it “languishes in comparative oblivion” and that the “scant attention that it does receive 
usually fails to serve it well”); B. Carmon Hardy, A Free People’s Intolerable Grievance: The 
Quartering of Troops and the Third Amendment, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A LIVELY HERITAGE 67 
(Jon Kukla ed., 1987) (asserting that students of constitutional history tend to dismiss it as “an 
insignificant legal fossil”). 
 109. The Court emptied the Clause of meaning five years after the Fourteenth Amendment 
was ratified, see Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), and it has remained that 
way ever since, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 377 
(1997) (“Not once in the 130 years since the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment has a law 
been declared unconstitutional as violating the privileges or immunities clause.”). 
 110. One might argue that the reason the Third Amendment has not experienced much 
interpretative change is that its text is clear and unambiguous. See, e.g., William Sutton Fields, 
The Third Amendment: Constitutional Protection from the Involuntary Quartering of Soldiers, 
124 MIL. L. REV. 195, 195 (1989); Seymour W. Wurfel, Quartering of Troops: The Unlitigated 
Third Amendment, 21 TENN. L. REV. 723, 729 (1951). But the First Amendment’s Free Speech 
Clause is just as clear and unambiguous as the Third Amendment yet has experienced drastic 
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far less interesting issue than the one raised by the dramatic changes 
of the Commerce Clause. The biological metaphor, if it holds true, may 
suggest that the Commerce Clause is somewhat more important than 
the Third Amendment to modern society. But it might also suggest 
that large changes in the Commerce Clause are all within the realm of 
the tolerable, and that the Commerce Clause is not quite as important 
as the amount of ink spilled on it would otherwise indicate. 
B. Clause Cooperativism and Constitutional Emergence 
Clause reductionism (like gene reductionism) does not tell the 
whole story. Most genes are both pleiotropic (one gene affects more 
than one phenotypic trait) and polygenic (more than one gene creates 
a phenotype).111 In other words, Gene 1 affects both your thumb size 
and foot size (pleiotropy), but you need both Gene 1 and Gene 2 to give 
you the particular thumb size that you have (polygeny).112 Thus, genes 
have multiple effects that are colored by the effects of other genes. The 
resulting bodies are not an inventory of individual genes that 
correspond one-to-one with traits but are integrated structures.113 
Evolutionary pressures may favor genes that “cooperate,” thus 
creating “teams” of genes.114 Genes for sharp teeth and genes for 
digesting meat, for example, are more likely to survive together than 
apart. Genes may compete on one level, but they also cooperate with 
one another to the extent their cooperation benefits the bodies that 
hold them. As Richard Dawkins has said, “To survive in the long run, 
a gene must be a good companion.”115 
The same could be said for our Constitution. Clauses need not 
be read in isolation; in many cases, it would be incomplete to do so. On 
a general level, this principle is reflected in a variety of interpretative 
forms. Akhil Amar, for example, has proposed intratextualism as an 
interpretive tool, in which he reads clauses containing the same word 
or phrase together to help inform the meaning of both.116 Looking at 
clauses together, as he does, can help explain their multiple and 
cooperative effects. 
 
changes in meaning through the years. Thus, I would tend to attribute the dormancy of the 
Third Amendment to other causes. 
 111. MAYR, supra note 37, at 196. 
 112. GOULD, I HAVE LANDED, supra note 60, at 234. 
 113. GOULD, supra note 56, at 67. 
 114. DAWKINS, supra note 56, at 169–72. 
 115. DAWKINS, supra note 55, at 5. 
 116. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999). 
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As a specific example of how clauses might cooperate, consider 
the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First 
Amendment. There is obviously some tension between them; one 
constrains government from prohibiting religious exercise and the 
other constrains government from favoring one religion over another. 
But both Clauses can be viewed as complementing rather than 
competing with each other; they provide different paths towards the 
same goal.117 Just as one cannot understand the appearance of a 
thumb by looking only at Gene 1, one cannot understand the 
constitutional implications for religion (even the free exercise of it) by 
looking only at the Free Exercise Clause. The analogy to gene 
cooperation may help shed light on the complementary nature of the 
two Clauses. 
Cooperativism leads to a larger point about holism. A complex 
organism exhibits nonadditive properties that are greater than the 
sum of individualistic genes.118 Complex bodies may be “[c]olonies of 
genes,” but they “acquire[] an individuality of their own.”119 These 
properties that are greater than the sum of gene effects are called 
emergent properties.120 At higher levels of complexity, holistic 
characteristics of the organism gain primacy because of the impact of 
organization, mutual interrelations, interactions, and 
interdependencies.121 Thus, a reductionist view of genes cannot tell the 
whole story; rather, emergent properties require a holistic study and 
understanding. Studying the individual, in other words, is as critical 
an undertaking as studying its genes. 
Similarly, the Constitution is more than its individual clauses 
read in isolation. Isolated readings are, of course, important, as is an 
understanding of interactions between clauses. But a holistic view of 
the Constitution is a critical third perspective that allows for the study 
 
 117. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004) (noting the tension but expressing the 
need to find “play in the joints”); Thomas C. Berg & Douglas Laycock, The Mistakes in Locke v. 
Davey and the Future of State Payments for Services Provided by Religious Institutions, 40 
TULSA L. REV. 227, 245–46 (2004) (stating that they express complementary principles); Michael 
W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 685, 730–31 (1992) (“[I]t makes more sense to see the two Religion Clauses as 
complementary and symmetrical propositions, protecting the autonomy of religious life against 
government inhibition as well as inducement.”). 
 118. STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE STRUCTURE OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 618–28 (2002). 
 119. DAWKINS, supra note 98, at 49. 
 120. Donald T. Hornstein, Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative Law, 54 
DUKE L.J. 913, 920 (2005). 
 121. MAYR, supra note 37, at 16–19. 
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of its emergent properties.122 Such properties might include a right to 
privacy arising from but greater than the individual clauses of the Bill 
of Rights;123 a principle of state sovereign immunity that is broader 
than the text of the Eleventh Amendment;124 and the law as integrity, 
as Ronald Dworkin argues.125 This all suggests that the way genes 
relate to each other and to the organisms they make up can help 
explain the way the clauses of the Constitution relate to each other 
and to the document as a whole. 
C. Constitutional Contrivance and Opportunism 
As I discussed earlier in Part III, path dependence can 
constrain the permissible range of variation that arises in a species. 
An effect is that adaptation often is achieved through contrivances 
built out of parts at hand. These contrivances may be cumbersome and 
relatively ill adapted for their function, yet they are the best that can 
evolve. Pandas, for example, have evolved a unique “thumb” to aid in 
stripping away the tough woody exterior of bamboo to reveal the more 
tender and edible shoots. The “thumb,” however, is not a digit at all 
but a common mammalian wrist bone that, in the panda, has become 
elongated.126 It is a contrivance, a contraption jury-rigged out of 
available parts. Though workable, it is clumsy and far from ideal.127 
Indeed, evolution is full of sub-optimal contrivances caused by path 
dependence.128 
Like biological organisms, the adaptations of a “living” 
Constitution may be cumbersome, clumsy, and constrained in their 
optimality. Optimal adaptations and changes are frustrated by an old 
 
 122. See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW (1969) (searching beyond individual clauses for larger patterns of constitutional meaning); 
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 77–101 (1980) 
(proposing that important themes and patterns arise from a holistic study of the Constitution); 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1192–94 (1987). 
 123. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–86 (1965) (finding a deep and 
coherent vision of privacy arising from the individual clauses of the Bill of Rights). 
 124. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
 125. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 225–75 (1986) (seeing the idea of “law as integrity” 
arising from a holistic view of the Constitution). 
 126. GOULD, supra note 56, at 21–24. 
 127. GOULD, supra note 57, at 23–24 (“So the panda must use parts on hand and settle for an 
enlarged wrist bone and a somewhat clumsy, but quite workable, solution. The sesamoid thumb 
wins no prize in an engineer’s derby.”). 
 128. RICHARD DAWKINS, THE EXTENDED PHENOTYPE 35–40 (1982). Path dependency has 
been explored in sociolegal systems elsewhere. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in 
Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641 (1996). 
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text and the path dependence of historical acceptance of meaning. 
Take the Fifth Amendment, for example. Unlike the Fourteenth 
Amendment, it lacks an Equal Protection Clause. Yet the possibility 
that the Constitution prohibited segregation in state schools129 but not 
in federal public schools was “unthinkable.”130 Thus, the Supreme 
Court inferred an equal protection “component” to the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.131 This is a cumbersome and 
clumsy textual analysis, and Chief Justice Warren’s opinion in Bolling 
does not suggest otherwise. But the Court had to work with the 
materials on hand, and though a contrivance, Bolling made the 
Constitution better adapted to the times.132 
The ability to create contrivances makes living 
constitutionalism similar to biological organisms in another respect. 
Evolution makes organisms opportunistic. Useful functionalities 
suddenly may have great capacity for other functionalities. Take a 
wing, for example. The first dinosaurs to develop feathers may have 
done so for purposes of insulation. Once densely covered with feathers, 
small feathered reptiles might have achieved—rather fortuitously—
the ability to glide. If gliding were a survival advantage, other 
evolutionary adaptations (lighter bones, wing muscles) would then 
have developed because they improved upon that functionality. The 
point is that the bird wing did not initially evolve for flying but 
adapted for flying opportunistically from an entirely separate 
functionality.133 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
one example of an opportunistic clause.134 Adopted in the aftermath of 
the Civil War, the Equal Protection Clause was intended to counteract 
 
 129. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 130. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). 
 131. Id. 
 132. For an additional defense of Bolling that relies upon commandeering the seemingly 
unrelated Bill of Attainder and Nobility Clauses, see Amar, supra note 116, at 770–73. Amar’s 
defense strikes me as another opportunity to see evolutionary-like contrivances in action. For a 
reaction, see Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The Trouble 
with Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730, 747 (2000) (calling Amar’s defense “ingenious, 
perhaps brilliant, but . . . requir[ing] a certain suspension of disbelief”). 
 133. GOULD, supra note 57, at 50, 57, 189; GOULD, supra note 56, at 122. 
 134. Some might also include the 1964 cases Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 
379 U.S. 241 (1964), and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), which used the expansive 
New Deal Commerce Clause to uphold the Civil Rights Act, as opportunities to get around the 
“path dependence” of the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), which would have had to have 
been overruled to uphold the Civil Rights Act on Fourteenth Amendment grounds. Others might 
put them in the category of “contrivances.” In either view, however, they can be viewed in 
biological metaphor. For more on these cases in their historical context, see Ackerman, supra 
note 68, at 1779–81. 
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racial discrimination. It was not intended to protect women from 
discrimination,135 and it remained limited in this way for many 
years.136 Yet as social norms changed and the concept of protecting 
women from invidious gender discrimination gained acceptance, 
people began to turn to the Constitution to find a way to curb 
governmental gender discrimination. The Equal Protection Clause 
was there, with language that might reasonably be used to protect 
against gender discrimination as well as racial discrimination.137 The 
Clause has been used to protect against other forms of discrimination 
not within its original meaning, including alienage and child 
legitimacy discrimination.138 
These constitutional contrivances and path dependences have 
another similarity with genetics: a historical record. Evolution stops 
short, leaves imperfections uncorrected, and keeps outmoded 
traditions. We see those imperfections and developments in the fossil 
record and in an organism’s genetic code. So too does constitutional 
history, in which “traditions may arise for small and sensible reasons 
but may then outlive their utility by persisting as oddities and 
impediments in an altered world.”139 We do not always let egregious 
 
 135. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (“A core purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was to do away with all governmentally imposed discrimination based on race.”); 
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment 
was aimed at racial—not gender—discrimination); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 
140–42 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment is not intended 
to protect women from being denied the right to practice law in a state); Slaughter-House Cases, 
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873) (discussing protections provided by the Fourteenth Amendment); 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights Amendments, 
1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 161, 162–63 (“When the post-Civil War amendments were added to the 
Constitution, women were not accorded the vote. [Married] women in many states could not 
contract, hold property, litigate on their own behalf, or even control their own earnings. The 
fourteenth amendment left all that untouched.”). 
 136. Oliver Wendell Holmes once derided it as the “last resort of constitutional arguments.” 
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). 
 137. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971) (holding that a statute could not give 
mandatory preference to members of one sex over the other, as this was the type of arbitrary 
legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause); see also United States v. Virginia, 
518 U.S. 515, 555–56 (1996) (applying heightened scrutiny to gender classifications under the 
Equal Protection Clause); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (same). The Equal Protection 
Clause was not there right away, however; the women’s suffragist movement in the late 1800s 
could not convince the Court to extend the franchise to women under it. See generally Adam 
Winkler, A Revolution Too Soon: Woman Suffragists and the “Living Constitution,” 76 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1456, 1518–26 (2001) (examining the reasons behind the Court’s refusal to grant women 
the franchise). 
 138. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461–64 (1988) (requiring intermediate scrutiny for 
discrimination against non-marital children); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) 
(requiring strict scrutiny for alienage classifications). 
 139. GOULD, I HAVE LANDED, supra note 60, at 181. 
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traditions persist—women can vote now140—but, as Sandy Levinson 
recognizes, we are a long way from a perfect Constitution.141 The 
Third Amendment, discussed above, is an oddity, a relic from another 
time. It persists because insufficient pressure exists to discard it. And 
yet—who knows?—perhaps someday when times have changed it will 
reemerge as a forceful and active provision. 
V. SOME PARTING THOUGHTS 
At the end of the day, the metaphor THE CONSTITUTION IS AN 
ORGANISM is still just a metaphor. There are fundamental and 
laughably obvious differences between the Constitution and an 
organism. As John Locke famously overstated: “All the artificial and 
figurative applications of Words Eloquence hath invented are for 
nothing else but to insinuate wrong Ideas, move the passions and 
thereby mislead the Judgment.”142 His underlying concern is valid: 
overuse of metaphor may impede rather than promote meaningful 
discussion. Overreliance on the conceptual similarities between X and 
Y, for example, can lead to an overly narrow conception of X.143 
I do not mean to exclude other conceptualizations of the 
Constitution. My task here has been to take one conceptualization, 
THE CONSTITUTION IS AN ORGANISM, and explore it in depth in an 
attempt to generate a conversation and enrich our understanding of 
the Constitution. My effort has been toward broadening, rather than 
narrowing. 
There is good reason to embark on the exploration despite the 
limits of metaphor. This metaphor is not simply a matter of rhetoric or 
 
 140. Id. at 182. 
 141. SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION 
GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006). 
 142. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 508 (P.H. Nidditch ed., 
1975) (1690); cf. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 69 (Harcourt, Brace & Co. 
1931) (1789) (“Metaphors are not Reasons.”); 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, WORKS 235 (William Tait 
1843) (1789) (calling metaphors a “pestilence”). Ironically, Benjamin Cardozo, a proponent of a 
“living” Constitution, held similar misgivings of metaphor. See Berkey v. Third Ave. R.R. Co., 
155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926) (“Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as 
devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it.”). A modern trend seems to have a 
more charitable view. See, e.g., MILNER BALL, LYING DOWN TOGETHER: LAW, METAPHOR, AND 
THEOLOGY 25–28 (1985); Michael Boudin, Antitrust Doctrine and the Sway of Metaphor, 75 GEO. 
L.J. 395, 395–96 (1986); Robert L. Tsai, Fire, Metaphor, and Constitutional Myth-Making, 93 
GEO. L.J. 181, 183–90 (2004). 
 143. J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE 247–48 (1998); LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 
157; see also Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 479 (“But when common or casual use [of 
evolutionary metaphor] does not correspond closely with biological evolution, it can create a false 
sense of familiarity that undermines an understanding of evolutionary processes . . . .”). 
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isolated analogy,144 though it certainly could be, and likely has been, 
used that way. Rather, the metaphor is an important tool for 
understanding, conceptualizing, and communicating one complex and 
ephemeral idea in terms of another that is more concrete and easier to 
understand.145 Metaphor has an important role to play, no less in 
constitutional law than in any other discipline.146 As Robert Shaw 
once artfully observed, “You don’t see something until you have the 
right metaphor to let you perceive it.”147 
At its broadest, this Essay shifts the ongoing debate over 
whether biology can tell us something about the law. I am hesitant to 
embrace current sentiments that Darwinian evolution is an all-
encompassing theory that applies with full force beyond the biological 
sciences.148 Stretched so thin, the risk that evolution can be 
misapplied is too strong, as history has proven.149 But that does not 
 
 144. See ARISTOTLE, THE ART OF RHETORIC 235 (H.C. Lawson-Tranced trans., 1991) 
(discussing the style of metaphor and providing examples of its use in past works); Elliot Zashin 
& Phillip C. Chapman, The Uses of Metaphor and Analogy: Toward a Renewal of Political 
Language, 36 J. POL. 290, 292 (1974) (explaining that metaphor is often used as a rhetorical 
device to communicate ideas to an unsophisticated audience). 
 145. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 153–54. 
 146. Tsai, supra note 142 (asserting that metaphor can play a unique and salutary role in 
constitutional law by structuring and reinforcing doctrinal categories, bestowing accessible 
meaning on amorphous constitutional theories, and by creating constitutional subcultures). 
Darwin himself borrowed Adam Smith’s invisible hand from economics to help conceptualize his 
theory of natural selection. GOULD, supra note 56, at 103. Other scientists have used metaphors 
to help understand natural phenomena. See, e.g., THEODORE L. BROWN, MAKING TRUTH: 
METAPHOR IN SCIENCE 146–59 (2003) (describing how the metaphor of common terms like 
“factory” can help clarify biological concepts such as a “cell”); id. at 14:  
 [M]etaphorical reasoning is at the very core of what scientists do when they 
design experiments, make discoveries, formulate theories and models, and 
describe their results to others—in short, when they do science and 
communicate about it. . . . [Metaphor] enables the scientist to interpret the 
natural world in wonderful and productive ways. 
 147. Hornstein, supra note 120, at 934. I am aware of my own rampant use of metaphor in 
this Article, including the anthropomorphization of the environment and of natural selection. 
 148. David Brooks, The Age of Darwin, N.Y. TIMES, at WK-14 (Apr. 15, 2007): 
 [W]hile we postmoderns say we detest all-explaining narratives, in fact a 
newish grand narrative has crept upon us . . . . [T]oday Darwin is 
everywhere. . . . The logic of evolution explains why people vie for status, 
form groups, fall in love and cherish their young. It holds that most 
everything that exists does so for a purpose. If some trait, like emotion, can 
cause big problems, then it must provide bigger benefits, because nature will 
not expend energy on things that don’t enhance the chance of survival. . . . 
We have a grand narrative that explains behavior and gives shape to history. 
We have a central cosmology to embrace, argue with or unconsciously submit 
to. 
 149.  See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (“It is better for all the world, if instead 
of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, 
society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. . . . Three 
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mean, as Brian Leiter and Michael Weisberg have asserted, that 
“evolutionary biology offers nothing to law.”150 To the contrary, 
evolutionary theory justifiably has great cross-disciplinary 
influence.151 At the very least, as I propose rather modestly here, 
constitutional theory could benefit from a more detailed 
understanding of biology (and its limits). A little Gould can go a long 
way. 
 
generations of imbeciles are enough.”); GOULD, supra note 56, at 36 (noting that Darwinism has 
been used to justify characterizing men as naturally aggressive and promiscuous and women as 
naturally discriminating and caring); J. PHILIPPE RUSHTON, RACE, EVOLUTION, AND BEHAVIOR: A 
LIFE HISTORY PERSPECTIVE 5–7, 259–62 (1995) (arguing that race evolved genetically from 
separate reproductive and survival strategies and accounts for differential behavior among 
races); Arthur Jensen, How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?, 39 HARV. 
EDUC. REV. 1, 117 (1969) (suggesting that IQ is a heritable genetic trait that has different levels 
in different races); Paul A. Lombardo, “The American Breed”: Nazi Eugenics and the Origins of 
the Pioneer Fund, 65 ALB. L. REV. 743, 754–66 (2002) (detailing the eugenics movement). See 
generally RICHARD S. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND 
CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994) (discussing the implications of supposed enduring 
racial differences in intelligence); HERBERT SPENCER, SOCIAL STATISTICS (1851) (applying the 
notion of “survival of the fittest” to human society and asserting that “unfit” people should be 
eliminated for the greater good). 
 150. Leiter & Weisberg, supra note 1, at 5. It may be that that assertion is broader than they 
intend it. Their specific arguments seem far narrower in scope (such as attacking the claim that 
robust findings of human behavioral biology support concrete policy changes to the law) than the 
assertion would warrant. 
 151. Elliott, supra note 3, at 90 (“Most realms of thought have been deeply influenced by 
Darwin.”). 
